Cooperation among nonhuman animals has been the topic of much theoretical and empirical research, but few studies have examined systematically the effects of various reward payoffs on cooperative behaviour. Here, we presented heterosexual pairs of cooperatively breeding cottontop tamarins with a cooperative problem-solving task. In a series of four experiments, we examined how the tamarins' cooperative performance changed under conditions in which (1) both actors were mutually rewarded, (2) both actors were rewarded reciprocally across days, (3) both actors competed for a monopolizable reward and (4) one actor repeatedly delivered a single reward to the other actor. The tamarins showed sensitivity to the reward structure, showing the greatest percentage of trials solved and shortest latency to solve the task in the mutual reward experiment and the lowest percentage of trials solved and longest latency to solve the task in the experiment in which one actor was repeatedly rewarded. However, even in the experiment in which the fewest trials were solved, the tamarins still solved 46 AE 12% of trials and little to no aggression was observed among partners following inequitable reward distributions. The tamarins did, however, show selfish motivation in each of the experiments. Nevertheless, in all experiments, unrewarded individuals continued to cooperate and procure rewards for their social partners.
There is no universally accepted definition of cooperation. Some researchers have focused on the behaviour of the individuals, and define cooperation based on the ability of actors to coordinate their actions (Boesch & Boesch 1989) . Others have concentrated on the distribution of costs and benefits, and defined cooperation as any act by one individual that benefits one or more other individuals, regardless of whether any coordination in action occurred (Hamilton 1964; Sachs et al. 2004) . Interactions that result in immediate, equal benefits for all actors are categorized as mutualism or by-product mutualism. In contrast, reciprocity or reciprocal altruism takes place when repeated interactions between individuals result in equal benefits distributed over time (Trivers 1971; Mesterton-Gibbons & Dugatkin 1997) . Here, we use a behaviour-focused definition in which cooperation occurs when two or more individuals combine efforts to achieve a common goal, and we examine the effects of various reward distributions on cooperative performance.
Numerous experimental studies have examined cooperative problem solving in animals (reviewed in Dugatkin 1997; Tomasello & Call 1997; Noe 2006; Silk, in press). However, as noted by de Waal & Davis (2003) , few studies have involved systematic manipulation of economic variables such as the relationship between the effort required to solve a task and the allocation of rewards to actors. In one such study, pairs of capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, were required to combine efforts to pull a weighted tray of food towards themselves. The capuchins showed lower cooperation success when presented with a tray baited for only one actor when compared with mutualism trials, despite food sharing being common following trials in which one actor was rewarded (de Waal & Berger 2000) . Hattori et al. (2005) showed that capuchin monkeys, C. apella, successfully performed complementary actions for mutual rewards, and then continued to cooperate but at a lower success rate when only one individual was rewarded on each trial. In these studies, the experimental
